I was asked yesterday has to what makes confidential informant (Human Source) training provided by HSM Training different from other providers. I wasn’t quite sure where to start. Then it dawned on me that it doesn’t actually start with us, it starts with the customer and what they need. And what they need is not always what they want.
Many law enforcement agencies are quite happy to sign up confidential informants with no real consideration given to the risks they are running.
Here is a case from Alabama where a Sheriffs department is being sued for $10 million
Drug informant shot 15 times sues Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office.
It will be interesting to see how this pans out and how much if anything is paid out.
Here is a story from Georgia that gives me some cause for concern. It is about a police officer convicted for misconduct in relation to the management of a confidential informant. While it is difficult in such cases to make a judgement without knowing all the facts the one thing that jumps out here is that it is agreed by all the officer’s intentions were good.
At HSM training and consultancy we are great believers in research relating to the management of confidential informants (CHIS, Confidential human intelligence sources, human source, HUMINT) . The more we look at the topic the better equipped we all should be. A recent paper The moral and emotional world of police informants was recently published by Bethan Loftus, Matthew Bacon, and Layla Skinns.
There is little point in collecting information from a confidential informant if the police can’t use it. How to use it in a way that is lawful and defendable is problematic for some agencies. The consequences of getting wrong are well documented and have resulted in deaths and lawsuits. This article discusses one such lawsuit and provides details of how to build a system to make sure everything is done lawfully and ethically. The article also addresses what needs to be done to ensure that informant information is used properly in obtaining warrants.
There have been serious allegations of corruption in Detroit Police Department involving a narcotics unit and the mismanagement of confidential informant finances. There are always risks when it comes to managing confidential informants (HUMINT, Human Sources, Covert Human Intelligence Sources) This article discusses some of the ways to manage these risks.
This article relates to informant management that resulted in a Chicago police officer being sentence to seven years imprisonment. This story is not about one bad cop, it is about a broken system for managing confidential informants (Confidential Human Sources, HUMINT, Covert Human Intelligence Sources , CHIS)
One problem we at HSM Training regularly encounter is that of how an agency can take information from a citizen in a secure and legally compliant way. Often within individual agencies a plethora of terms is used to try and cover the different circumstances in which a person provides information to a law enforcement agency. Terms such as: confidential informant, informer, informant, casual contact, confidential source, confidential contact, agent, CHIS, human source and even witness are often used interchangeably by members of an agency. Not only does this lead to much confusion it means the limited resources of the agency are often wasted with needless bureaucracy. More seriously, it can often mean that people who put themselves at risk by providing information are not properly protected by the agency.
When it comes to passing information law enforcement needs to identify and use specific named categories into which they can place the individual who is supplying information. When placed in the identified category the agency can then manage that individual according to an agreed and document set of standards. Using identified clearly identified categories and working to agreed standards ensures that the risk to the person and the agency are managed effectively. They will also ensure that there is legal compliance.
There are three categories that command an adequate starting place all of which will fall within the broader understanding of the often, used term 'confidential informant'.
'Registered Human Source.' This term refers to a person with whom an agency enters a relationship in order to obtain information over an identified period and under specified set of circumstances. This relationship is authorised by someone in a management position within the agency and all aspects of that relationship are documented. [In Canada, this term also includes a person who has “agent” status.]
'Witness.' This term refers to a person with whom the agency enters into a relationship with the intention that the person will give evidence in court against another person. Such a person may or may not be serving a prison sentence at time of passing the information. The person knows they will be testifying.
'Member of the public.' This term refers to all other persons that do not fall within either Category 1 or 2 above and refers to any person passing information to the law enforcement agency in the expectation that their identity remains confidential (i.e. the intention is the identity of this person will be protected except when there is a legal requirement to disclose it).
At HSM Training we work in many different jurisdictions with different legislative processes. However, we have yet to encounter a legislative regime where this method of classification will not work. This system may need minor tweaking but it will help you address this problem in a cost effective manner. If you need help with this problem please contact us at: info@hsmtraining.com
Save yourself some time and trouble and get a system that protects everyone involved.
Interesting story about an officers inappropriate sexual relationship with an informant ("human source", "confidential informant", "covert human intelligence source")
https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/01/26/sex-harassment-settlement-minnesota-bca-informant
As always in these cases it is good to ask a few pertinent questions about the management of confidential informants and hopefully the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension is asking itself how this situation occurred.
It is easy to cast all the blame on one "bad apple" but if one wants to eradicate this type of behaviour one needs a full independent audit of what went wrong and not one carried out by people with a vested interest in sweeping the issue under the rug.
Three things will help prevent this sort of event:
If you want to know more get in touch we provide audits and training. And we are significantly cheaper than $110,000!
